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Heres the Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations g. Captain. SS El Faro. Photo Tote Maritime. The U. S. Coast Guard today has released the S. S. El Faro Marine Board of Investigation report, which includes a detailed account of the event along with the MBIs conclusions on contributing factors and recommendations. The 1. S. S. El Faro and 3. October 1, 2. 01. American history. The 7. Jacksonville, Florida, on a voyage to San Juan, Puerto Rico, on Sept. Bahamas near the eye of Hurricane Joaquin. The report proposes a total of 3. Commandant of the Coast Guard. Of note, the MBI recommends that the Coast Guard initiate a civil penalty against El Faros operator, TOTE Services, but the MBI does not recommend any suspension or revocation action against any credentialed mariner or criminal prosecution against any person or entity. The MBI also does not recommend any administrative or punitive action against any Coast Guard personnel. The most important thing to remember is that 3. If adopted, we believe the safety recommendations in our report will improve safety of life at sea said Capt. Jason Neubauer, chairman, El Faro Marine Board of Investigation, U. S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard standard procedure and 4. USC 6. 3 requires this type of report to be done for all marine casualties under Coast Guard authority. The investigation was conducted by the U. S. Coast Guard with the full cooperation of the National Transportation Safety Board, which is conducting its own investigation into the accident. NTSB investigators will meet in December to determine probable cause and vote on safety recommendations identified their investigation. The Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation Report can be accessed along with other investigation documents at the following link http www. News by RegionHeadquartersEl Faro Marine Board of Investigation. You can download the full report HERE opens as PDF. Below we have provided the Marine Board of Investigations executive summary, conclusions, and recommendations from the report. Executive Summary. The final photograph taken of the El Faro by TMPR Terminal Manager on September 2. The best container stowage solutions are built around their intended cargo All elements of the container stowage solution influence each other understanding all. Videotel produces eLearning training materials and management software for all commercial maritime sectors, ports and terminals, offshore and more. Webbased Customs filing, includes Automated Commercial Environment, ACE Software, AMS Software, ISF 102, eManifest, JP24, E. U ENS, much moreCredit U. S. Coast Guard. The loss of the U. S. flagged cargo vessel EL FARO, along with its 3. U. S. history, and resulted in the highest death toll from a U. S. commercial vessel sinking in almost 4. At the time of the sinking, EL FARO was on a U. Mv vslname cargo securing manual. S. domestic voyage with a full load of containers and roll on roll off cargo bound from Jacksonville, Florida to San Juan, Puerto Rico. As EL FARO departed port on September 2. Bahamas Islands was rapidly intensifying in strength. The storm system evolved into Hurricane Joaquin and defied weather forecasts and standard Atlantic Basin hurricane tracking by traveling southwest. As various weather updates were received onboard EL FARO, the Master directed the ship southward of the direct course to San Juan, which was the normal route. The Masters southern deviation ultimately steered EL FARO almost directly towards the strengthening hurricane. As EL FARO began to encounter heavy seas and winds associated with the outer bands of Hurricane Joaquin, the vessel sustained a prolonged starboard list and began intermittently taking water into the interior of the ship. Shortly after 5 3. AM on the morning of October 1, 2. At the same time, EL FARO engineers were struggling to maintain propulsion as the list and motion of the vessel increased. Tv Capture Drivers Ver 6.30 more. After making a turn to shift the vessels list to port, in order to close an open scuttle, EL FARO lost propulsion and began drifting beam to the hurricane force winds and seas. At approximately 7 0. AM, without propulsion and with uncontrolled flooding, the Master notified his company and signaled distress using EL FAROs satellite distress communication system. Shortly after signaling distress, the Master ordered abandon ship. The vessel, at the time, was near the eye of Hurricane Joaquin, which had strengthened to a Category 3 storm. Rescue assets began search operations, and included a U. S. Air National Guard hurricane tracking aircraft overflight of the vessels last known position. After hurricane conditions subsided, the Coast Guard commenced additional search operations, with assistance from commercial assets contracted by the vessels owner. The search located EL FARO debris and one deceased crewmember. No survivors were located during these search and rescue operations. Illustration of significant events between 4 2. AM on October 1 and the sinking, showing ship heading and course over ground. Credit U. S. Coast Guard. On October 3. 1, 2. U. S. Navy surface asset contracted by the NTSB, using side scan sonar, located the main wreckage of EL FARO at a depth of over 1. EL FAROs voyage data recorder was successfully recovered from EL FAROs debris field on August 1. MBI to help determine the circumstances leading up to this tragic incident. Over the course of the investigation the MBI relied on visits to EL FAROs sister vessel, EL YUNQUE, to help understand the internal configuration of the PONCE class vessels and also identify operational and maintenance issues that could have impacted both vessels. The scope of the MBI was expanded to include the entire Coast Guard Alternate Compliance Program after Authorized Class Society performance and regulatory oversight concerns were noted for EL FARO, EL YUNQUE, and several additional U. S. flagged vessels in the program. Conclusions The Marine Board of Investigation identified the following series of events and associated contributing factors. Event 1 EL FARO Sailed Within Close Proximity to Hurricane Joaquin TOTE did not ensure the safety of marine operations and failed to provide shore side nautical operations supports to its vessels. TOTE did not identify heavy weather as a risk in the Safety Management System SMS and the Coast Guard had not exercised its flag state authority to require identification of specific risks. TOTE and the Master did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating, and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage. TOTE and the Master and ships officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions. TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions. TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of EL FARO during the accident voyage. The National Hurricane Center NHC created and distributed tropical weather forecasts for Tropical Storm and Hurricane Joaquin, which in later analysis proved to be inaccurate. Applied Weather Technologies used these inaccurate forecasts to create the Bon Voyage System BVS weather packages. The Master and deck officers were not aware of the inherent latency in the BVS data when compared to the NHC forecasts. Additionally, the Master and deck officers were not aware that they received one BVS data package with a redundant hurricane trackline. The Master and deck officers relied primarily on graphical BVS weather forecasts rather than the most current NHC data received via SAT C. EL FARO crew did not take advantage of BVSs tropical update feature and the ability to send BVS weather information directly to the bridge. Daria Gps Voice S there. The Master did not effectively integrate the use of Bridge Resource Management techniques during the accident voyage.